Instability in the Great Lakes Region

FILIP REYNTJENS

INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines a quarter century of instability, violence, war, and extreme human suffering in Central Africa. Considered in the past as peripheral, land-locked, and politically and economically uninteresting, in the 1990s the African Great Lakes region found itself at the heart of a profound geopolitical recomposition with continental repercussions. Countries as varied as Namibia in the south, Libya in the north, Angola in the west, and Uganda in the east became entangled in wars that ignored international borders. However, the seeds of instability were sown from the beginning of the 1960s: the massive exile of the Rwandan Tutsi, who fled to neighboring countries during and after the revolution of 1959–1961, and the virtual exclusion of Tutsi from public life in Rwanda; the radicalization of Burundian Tutsi who monopolized power and wealth; and the insecure status of Kinyarwanda speakers in the Kivu provinces—all these factors were to merge with others to create the conditions for prolonged violence.

I argue that a unique and contingent combination of factors explains the protracted instability and its dynamics. Although this combination of factors helps to understand the past, it may also have some value for assessing the future. Indeed, as long as these factors persist, the risk of conflict continues to exist. The factors studied here are (1) the weakness of the Zaïrean/Congolese state, (2) the territorial
extension of neighboring countries' civil wars, (3) the shifting regional alliances, (4) the profitability of war, (5) the linking up of local stakes, and (6) the impunity for major human rights violations.¹

The acute destabilization of the region started on October 3, 1990, when the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) attacked Rwanda from Uganda with Ugandan support. After the collapse of the 1993 Arusha peace accord and following the genocide and massive war crimes and crimes against humanity, the RPF won a military victory and took power in July 1994. Over a million people died and over 2 million fled abroad, mainly to Zaire and Tanzania. Eight months earlier the democratic transition had ended in disaster in Burundi: tens of thousands of people were killed, and the country embarked on a decadelong civil war. At the end of 1993 some two hundred thousand Burundian refugees inundated the Zairean Kivu provinces, followed in mid-1994 by 1.5 million Rwandans. This was the beginning of the dramatic extension of neighboring conflicts, most prominently of the Rwandan civil war.

Given the complexity and abundance of events, I propose a brief timeline here.² After the genocide and the overthrow of the Rwandan Hutu-dominated regime in July 1994, 1.5 million Hutu refugees settled just across the border in Zaire. Among them were the former government army, the Forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR), and militia. They launched cross-border raids and increasingly became a serious security threat for the new regime, dominated by the mainly Tutsi RPF. First under the guise of the "Banyamulenge rebellion" and later the "AFDL (Alliance des Forces pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre) rebellion," the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA, the military wing of the RPF that became the national army after its victory) attacked and cleared the refugee camps during the autumn of 1996. Having security concerns similar to those of Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi joined from the beginning, later to be followed by a formidable regional coalition intent on toppling Zairean president Mobutu Sese Seko. In May 1997 Laurent Kabila seized power in Kinshasa. During the latter half of 1997 relations between the new Congolese regime and its erstwhile Rwandan and Ugandan allies soured rapidly.

In August 1998 Rwanda and Uganda again attacked, and they did so once more under the guise of a new rebel movement, the RCD (Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie), which, just like the AFDL, was created in Kigali. The invading countries expected this to be to be a remake of the first war, only much faster this time. However, the swift action they expected failed to occur because of a spectacular shift of alliances, when Angola and Zimbabwe sided with Kabila against their former allies Rwanda and Uganda. This intervention made up for the weakness of the Congolese army, thus ensuring military stalemate along a more or less stable front line that cut the country in two. Considerable pressure from the region led to the signing of the Lusaka Accord in July 1999.³ However, Laurent Kabila blocked its implementation, and only after his assassination and succession by his son Joseph in January 2001 was the peace process resumed. Again under great pressure, by South Africa in particular, and after cumbersome negotiations
did the Congolese parties sign a “Global and All-Inclusive Accord” (AGI) in December 2002.  

It took three-and-a-half more years to implement the accord, a long and bumpy road replete with incidents, obstructions, negotiations, and renegotiations and constantly threatened by the resumption of the war. An informal international trusteeship, supported by a large UN peacekeeping force (MONUSCO) and the international and Congolese civil society, imposed elections on very reluctant political players. These took place in July through October 2006 in an overall free and fair fashion. Joseph Kabila and his party, PPRD, won the elections. Kabila was sworn in in December; both houses of parliament were installed in January 2007, and a new government was formed in early February, thus formally ending the transition.

However, the eastern part of the country remained unstable, and the Congolese government failed to establish full territorial control. Several local militias, captured under the general heading “militiamen,” as well as the Rwandan Hutu rebel movement, the Forces démocratiques pour la libération du Rwanda (FDLR), remained active and were hardly hindered by the national army in their violence against local populations and the exploitation of natural resources. In addition, Rwanda continued to back rebel movements in the DRC. The Congrès national pour la défense du peuple (CNPD) was created by Laurent Nkunda in December 2006, followed after it split in rival factions by the Mouvement du 23 mars (M23) set up in May 2011. As the UN Group of Experts and Human Rights Watch, among others, published precise information on Rwandan support for the M23, countries like the United States, the UK, Sweden, and The Netherlands suspended part of their aid to Kigali. A UN-sanctioned and SADC (Southern African Development Community)-backed “Force Intervention Brigade,” made up of troops from South Africa, Tanzania, and Malawi and sent in support of MONUSCO, finally defeated the M23 in November 2013. This effectively cut Rwanda’s foothold in the DRC, while pressure from Washington and London prevented Kigali from resuming destabilizing activities there. However, in 2015 Rwanda started supporting Burundian rebels, as will be discussed below. The defeat of M23 did not, however, signal the full restoration of state control in eastern DRC; illegal exploitation of natural resources, taxation, and (cross-border) trade continue to flourish in a region characterized by hybrid governance.

STATE FAILURE

Well before the start of the first war in the fall of 1996 Zaire had ceased to empirically perform a number of essential state functions, such as territorial control, public taxation, the provision of essential services, the monopoly of violence, and the rule of law. The gradual failure of the state preceded its collapse, and the first signs of a “shadow state” were visible in the 1970s after the “Zairianisation” measures allowed the transfer of large parts of the economy to political and military
elites. This heralded the putting into place of a prebendary and nepotimonal exercise of power that profoundly corrupted official institutional norms and frameworks.

Nzongola writes that "the major determinant of the present conflict and instability in the Great Lakes Region is the decay of the state and its instruments of rule in the Congo. For it is this decay that made it possible for Lilliputian states the size of Congo's smallest province, such as Uganda, or even that of a district, such as Rwanda, to take it upon themselves to impose rulers in Kinshasa and to invade, occupy and loot the territory of their giant neighbor." Indeed, the void left by the state was filled by other, nonstate actors. Some of these—like NGOs, churches, local civil society, or traditional structures—assumed some functions abandoned by the state, but other less benign players also seized the public space left by the retreating state: warlords, (ethnic) militias, and "entrepreneurs of insecurity," both domestic and from neighboring countries. This not only explains the extreme weakness in battle of the PAZ/FAC, which were the mirror of the collapsed state, but also why a small country like Rwanda was able, without much of a fight, to establish extraordinary territorial, political, and economic control over its vast neighbor. Achille Mbembe has called the "satellisation" of entire provinces by (much) smaller but stronger states was accompanied by the emergence of new forms of privatized governance.

In eastern DRC most functions of sovereignty were thus privatized, as some examples show. In 1996 and again in 1998 the Zairean/Congolese government forces hardly engaged in combat; during the war that started in 1998 foreign and nonstate forces faced each other—the Angolan and Zimbabwean (and, at one point, Chadian and Namibian) armies and Rwandan and Burundian rebel groups on Kabila's side, and on the other the Rwandan and Ugandan armies with their RCD and MLC (Mouvement de Libération du Congo) proxies. Territorial control, the provision of (in)security, and the management of populations were taken over by militias, rebel groups—both domestic and from neighbors Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi—and the armies of neighboring countries (and even the former Rwandan government army).

A UN panel monitoring an arms embargo reported compelling data on the state's absence in controlling cross-border traffic, including at ports and airports; indeed, "irregular aircraft practices are the norm." The state's fiscal function, too, which was limited anyway, was profoundly eroded. Import and export levies collected by militias, rebel groups, and Rwandan and Ugandan 'elite networks' funded the wars and lined individuals' pockets. Toll barriers (péages) were put up to extract resources from peasants taking their meager surplus products to markets, so the possession of a gun was a sufficient means to impose internal taxation. In North Kivu travelers passing between the zones controlled by two opposing wings of the RCD were required to declare goods and pay duties at the "border." There were annual taxes on vehicles and a panoply of charges for individual journeys, road "tolls," and "insurance." The RCD taxed the coltan trade, sold mining
rights, and demanded license fees, nonrefundable deposits, various export taxes, and a "war effort tax." The panel documented a number of other examples showing that borders and their control became prized assets for armed groups and their sponsors in Rwanda and Uganda, allowing them the necessary revenue to maintain and resupply troops. It concluded that "as an institutionally weak state, the DRC significantly lacks control over both customs and immigration." Recent reports by the UN Group of Experts continue to make similar observations.

TERRITORIAL EXTENSION OF CIVIL WARS

Although the sources of instability in the Great Lakes region were, in essence, domestic, reflecting as they did the political conflicts in Angola, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, the Kivu, and Zaire more generally, their repercussions were increasingly felt throughout the larger region. The geographic proximity of conflicts, the game of alliances, and population flows reinforced this regionalization of violence.

In the mid-1990s insurgent forces of several neighboring countries used the territory of Zaire as a base for attack and retreat. They included the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) from Uganda, several groups (CNDD-FDD and Puliphehu-FNL in particular) from Burundi, and Angolan UNITA. From mid-1994 the most serious threat concerned Rwanda after 1.5 million Hutu refugees fled into North and South Kivu after the genocide and RPF's victory. Rwanda faced an increasing security threat after 1995, particularly in the three western préfectures, affected by commando operations emanating, at least in part, from Zairean territory. Rwandan vice president and de facto leader Paul Kagame candidly told journalist François Misser that "if another war must be waged, we shall fight in a different fashion, elsewhere. We are prepared. We are ready to fight any war and we shall contain it along the border with Zaire." Officials from the United States and The Netherlands, two countries close to the Rwandan regime, confirmed that they had had to dissuade Kagame on several occasions from "breaking the abscess" of the Rwandan refugees in Zaire the hard way. During a visit to the United States in August 1995, one month before the start of the "rebellion," Kagame told the Americans that he was about to intervene, the more so since, according to some sources, the ex-PAR were preparing a large-scale offensive against Rwanda from Goma and Bukavu. Faced with the obvious unwillingness or inability of the international community to tackle this problem, Kigali's patience had reached its limits.

In September 1996, under the guise of the "Banyamulenge rebellion" first and later hiding behind the back of the AFDL created in Kigali, the RPA cleared the refugee camps around Goma and Bukavu. Thousands of civilian refugees were killed in the initial attack, hundreds of thousands were "voluntarily/forcibly" returned to Rwanda, and hundreds of thousands more moved westward, where they became the victims of a phased extermination campaign by the RPA. Fourtier noted that "the strategic choice (of Kigali) to attack the camps clearly shows the fundamental objectives of a 'rebellion' that was no longer (a rebellion), because
what really happened was the extension of the Rwandan civil war into Zairean
territory.27

Faced with similar—though less vital—security concerns, Uganda and to a
lesser extent Burundi participated in the war, thereby destabilizing the bases of
their “own” rebel groups. By the end of 1996 Angola, another country facing a re-
bellion (UNITA) supported by Mobutu’s cronies and operating in part from Zaire,
realized that its security concerns had not been met by the situation created in
eastern Zaire and decided to make a difference.28 Luanda’s position, which was to
expand the ambitions of the rebellion to the whole of Zaire, eventually prevailed.29
Angola provided the crucial impetus through the Katangese Gendarmes, known
as the “Tigres.”30 During two weeks in mid-February 1997 several battalions (two
to three thousand “Tigres” men) were airlifted to Kigali and taken from there by
road to Goma and Bukavu. The Angolan army, obviously in close cooperation
with Rwanda, supported this operation logistically. The entry of the Gendarmes
and, later during the war, of other units of the Angolan army caused the “rebellion”
to pick up speed. Whereas it took four months (October 1996 to January 1997) to
occupy less than one-twentieth of the country, the remainder of Zaire was cap-
tured in the three months that followed the arrival of the Tigres (mid-February
to mid-May 1997). The outcome of the war, namely regime change in Kinshasa,
was the consequence of the merger of several civil wars that were intrinsically
unlinked but that came together against the background of a weak state in Zaire,
opportunistic alliances, and geographical proximity.

The support Rwanda later gave to the Congolese rebel groups RCD, CNDP, and
M23 expressed this same logic of waging war on the territory of a vast but weak
neighbor. More recently, in the context of strongly deteriorating bilateral relations
and the violent unraveling of political conflict over Burundian president Pierre
Nkurunziza winning a third unconstitutional term in office, Rwanda assisted in
the recruitment, training, and arming of Burundian refugees on its soil with the
intent to topple the Burundian regime.31 At least some of these insurgents trans-
sited through South Kivu.32 As with previous attempts by Rwanda to destabilize
neighbors, this led to donors expressing serious concern, including the United
States.33

SHIFTING ALLIANCES

The players in what became a regional civil war reasoned in the logic of “the
enemy of my enemy is my friend.” The fact that Mobutu had made many ene-
 mies explains the emergence of the formidable regional alliance that eventually
defeated him. But that such a circumstantial alliance is also very fragile was clear
during the second war, from 1998, when yesterday’s friends became today’s ene-
 mies almost overnight; indeed, coalitions shifted dramatically.

At the beginning of the resumption of the war in August 1998 Kabila was saved
by Angola and Zimbabwe, who turned against their former allies Rwanda and
Uganda. Angola was concerned about two developments. Former Mobutu generals Nzimbi and Baramoto had been seen in Kigali before the new war broke out, and some politicians of the Mobutu era openly joined the rebellion, as did some former FAP units. Because of their support for UNITA in the past, these elements were considered archenemies in Luanda. Moreover, Angolan intelligence was aware that there were contacts between UNITA and the rebel leadership and their Rwandan and Ugandan sponsors. Indeed, elements of UNITA later fought alongside rebel forces, the MLC in particular. Given the likelihood that the Angolan civil war would resume (which indeed materialized a few months later), for Luanda the choice was clear: those supporting UNITA were the enemy, and their enemies merited support.

The motives behind the involvement of Zimbabwe were diverse. The DRC had an important war debt outstanding toward Zimbabwe, and the Zimbabweans were worried about repayment in the event of Kabila being overthrown. A second motive was also economic: Zimbabwean business interests had made efforts during the past year to penetrate the Congolese market and to invest in the mining sector, partly at the expense of South African ventures. Some of Zimbabwean president Robert Mugabe’s business associates and high-ranking army officers stood to lose important assets if Kabila were defeated. Finally, the “old revolutionary” Mugabe saw the Congolese crisis as an opportunity to reassert some of his leadership in the region,63 lost to President Nelson Mandela’s South Africa, and to short-circuit the new leaders of the “African Renaissance,” such as Yoweri Museveni of Uganda and Kagame,64 who were being promoted—notably by the Americans65—much to Mugabe’s dismay.

Other realignments soon occurred. Thus, the local mai-mai militias in the east, which had been fighting Kabila even before he came to power, now aligned with him in the context of an “anti-Tutsi” coalition.66 Within the same logic an even more spectacular shift brought the ex-FAR and former Interahamwe militia into Kabila’s camp, although less than a year earlier the Rwandan Hutu had suffered massive loss of life during and after the previous rebellion at the hands of Kabila’s AFDL and his erstwhile Rwandan allies. FAR were brought in from neighboring countries, rearmed, retrained, and deployed on the northern and eastern fronts.67 A UN report noted that “the changing alliances in and around the DRC have unexpectedly worked to the advantage of the former Rwandan government forces” because the ex-FAR and ex-Interahamwe “have now become a significant component of the international alliance against the Congolese rebels and their presumed sponsors, Rwanda and Uganda.” The Commission found it “profoundly shocking that this new relationship has conferred a form of legitimacy on the Interahamwe and the ex-FAR.” Likewise, the Burundian FDD’s alliance with Kabila opened access to equipment, weapons, training, bases, and even a degree of respectability. They were headquartered in Lubumbashi, and troops recruited in Tanzanian refugee camps were transferred to the DRC. The frailty of the alliances again showed when conflict erupted between Rwanda and a major section of the Banyamulenge,
who had earlier sought the protection of Kigali while at the same time being used as a pretext for the Rwandan invasion in 1996. Already by the autumn of 1996 Banyamulenge leaders had realized that Rwanda was instrumentalizing them and that, rather than protecting their community, their close association with Kigali further marginalized and threatened them. This feeling of being used increased further when, in October and December of 1996, the RPA attempted to convince Banyamulenge leaders to resettle their entire community in Rwanda, an idea most of them rejected.\textsuperscript{43} Disagreements with RPA commanders of the FAC over command positions and deployment of troops further exacerbated the tensions in the early months of 1998. When the second rebellion started in August 1998 the Banyamulenge were again faced with a crucial dilemma. On the one hand, they knew Rwanda was once again going to instrumentalize them and that this would worsen their relations with other groups even further; but on the other, they needed the physical security the RPA provided, including for their men in Kinshasa. As the war progressed, it became increasingly clear that those Banyamulenge (like Azarias Ruberwa, Moïse Nyarugabo, and Bizima Karaha) who had joined the RCD were a minority and that most Banyamulenge opposed the RCD and Rwanda.

The most dramatic shift occurred between the former core allies Rwanda and Uganda. In the words of Charles Onyango-Obbo, chief editor of the Ugandan daily \textit{The Monitor}, in August 1999 "the impossible happened"\textsuperscript{44}: the Rwandan and Ugandan armies fought a heavy battle in Kisangani, and more clashes followed later. In May to June 2000 the RPA and the UPDF again confronted each other in Kisangani; heavy weapons were used, and some 400 civilians and 120 soldiers were killed. The rift had several causes. Whereas Uganda wished to avoid repeating the mistake made in 1996–1997, when Kabila was parachuted into power without much Congolese ownership, Rwanda preferred a quick military solution and the installation of yet another figurehead in Kinshasa. Prunier noted that Kampala had no problem with an independent and efficient government in the DRC, a vision dramatically opposed to the view of a Kigali that wanted to keep its Congolese proxies under control.\textsuperscript{45} In addition, "entrepreneurs of insecurity" belonging to the elite networks in both countries were engaged in a competition to extract Congolese resources (see below).\textsuperscript{46} Finally, Museveni resented the geopolitical ambitions of his small Rwandan neighbor and the lack of gratitude displayed by Kagame, who owed his accession to power to the support of Uganda.

Just like the extension into the DRC of the Rwandan civil war, the conflict with Uganda was fought out on the soil of a weak neighbor and, in part, by proxy. Both countries supported rebel movements and (ethnic) militias in the context of an increasingly fragmented political-military landscape. They continuously traded accusations of supporting each other's rebel groups, which both sides indeed did. In March 2001 the Ugandan government declared Rwanda a "hostile nation." Despite attempts at appeasement during the following months, on August 28, 2001, Museveni sent a long and bitter letter to the UK secretary of state for International Development Clare Short 'about the deteriorating situation in the bilateral relations
between Uganda and the government of Rwanda, led by President Kagame. As a consequence Rwandan-Ugandan relations further worsened, and troops were massed on both sides of their common border. On November 6, 2001, short summoned her two protégés to London to put an end to a situation that risked becoming a fiasco for the UK, just like the Ethiopian-Eritrean war of 1998-2000 had been one for the United States. Although relations did not become cordial, the threat of direct war subsided, and relations markedly improved in the mid-2000s.

PROFITABILITY OF WAR

A UN panel set up in 2003 published a number of increasingly detailed reports on the criminal practices of “elite networks,” both Congolese and from neighboring countries, and identified elements common to all these networks. They consisted of a small core of political and military elites and businesspeople and, in the case of the occupied territories, rebel leaders and administrators. Members of these networks cooperated to generate revenue and, in the case of Rwanda, institutional financial gain. They derived this benefit from a variety of criminal activities, including theft, embezzlement and diversion of “public” funds, underevaluation of goods, smuggling, false invoicing, nonpayment of taxes, kickbacks to officials, and bribery. International “entrepreneurs of insecurity” (among them Viktor Bout) were closely involved in this criminal economy, as the local and regional actors drew support from the networks and “services” (e.g., air transport, illegal arms dealing, and international transactions of pillaged resources) of organized international criminal groups.

The linkage between military engagement and illegal economic activities was a clear trend. Indeed, pillaging was no longer an unfortunate side effect of war; rather, economic interests became war’s prime driving force. Dietrich has drawn attention to the dangers inherent in what he calls “military commercialism,” whereby a stronger state employs the national military in a weaker neighboring country, supporting either the sovereign power (as did Zimbabwe) or insurgents (in the cases of Rwanda and Uganda) in exchange for access to profits. Under these circumstances economic criteria invade military decision making, for example with regard to troop deployment and areas of operation. In addition, if domestic resources are scarce or cannot be illicitly mobilized as a result of the scrutiny of the international community, cross-border predatory behavior, out of sight and/or hidden behind political and military concerns, provides an alternative resource. Finally, when control over resources has become a military objective in itself, this is a strong disincentive for troop withdrawal simply because the “expeditionary corps” and those they support, whether rebels or governments, need each other. Put simply by Samset, “war facilitates excessive resource exploitation, and excessive exploitation spurs continued fighting.” A panel monitoring the UN arms embargo confirmed that “the most profitable financing source for armed groups remains the exploitation, trade and transportation of natural resources.”
All supply chains from areas controlled by armed groups are compromised." Crawford Young notes that this "ability to sustain themselves through traffic in high value resources under their control" distinguishes contemporary insurgents from their predecessors.45

Nowhere is this as clear as in the case of Rwanda, a small and poor country with few natural resources but with a large and efficient army. In 2000 the revenue collected by the RPA in the DRC from coltan alone was believed to be US$80 to 100 million, roughly the equivalent of official Rwandan defense expenditure, which stood at US$86 million.46 In a similar vein the UN panel found that in 1999-2000, "the RPA must have made at least US$250 million over a period of 18 months."47 Maryse calculated that in 1999 the total value added of diamond, gold, and coltan plundered in the DRC amounted to 6.1 percent of Rwanda’s GDP,48 and to 146 percent of its official military expenditure.49 The Kigali economy, which is virtually disconnected from the Rwandan economy as a whole, was largely dependent on mineral and other extraction in the DRC (as well as on international aid). Pillaging the Congo not only allowed the Rwandan government to beef up the military budget in a way that was invisible to the donor community but also bought much needed domestic elite loyalty.50 Despite international condemnations, these practices continue—albeit on a lesser scale—as noted by the UN Group of Experts in 2013: "Mineral tracing tags . . . continue to be sold on the black market in Rwanda, which can allow minerals sourced in conflict areas in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo to enter the international market."51 Jackson calls this the "economisation of conflict": a process whereby conflicts progressively reorient from their original goals (in the case of Rwanda, securing its borders) toward profit and through which conflict actors capitalize increasingly on the economic opportunities that war opens up.52

After officially withdrawing its troops from the DRC in September 2002 as a result of discreet but intense international pressure, Rwanda therefore changed tactics by seeking alternative allies on the ground and sponsoring autonomist movements in order to consolidate its long-term influence in eastern Congo and make the most out of the Kivu region.53 In addition, even after its official withdrawal, Rwanda maintained a clandestine military presence in the DRC, at least until late 2013.54 We have seen earlier that its support for the CNDP and the M23 caused serious conflicts with powerful members of the international community.

Uganda, too, greatly benefited from its military/commercial presence in the DRC. Although, unlike Rwanda, it did not set up an extra-budgetary system to finance its activities there, the UN Panel found that the "re-exportation economy" had a significant impact on the financing of the war in three ways: by increasing the incomes of key businessmen, traders, and other dealers by improving Uganda’s balance of payments; and by bringing more money to the treasury through various taxes on goods, services, and international trade.55 By way of example, Ugandan gold exports totaled US$90 million in 2000—while the country produced practically no gold.56
The logic of military commercialism could also be seen in the strategies developed by domestic armed groups. Thus the Walikale region west of Goma became a battleground between RCD rebels and mai-mai, both supposedly integrated into the FARDC but who ceased to obey the FARDC and the military region commander, an RCD general who refused to obey orders from Kinshasa. In their fight for control over Walikale's cassiterite mines, these ex-mai-mai units cooperated with FDLR troops. Small aircraft based in Goma collected the cassiterite "caught" by the RCD for purchasing agents; once it arrived in Goma, shares were distributed to local military and political authorities before being transported across the border to Rwanda, where a smelting plant is located near Kigali, or exported to South Africa.

Clearly, criminal or informal regional integration was very real, and it was certainly more effective than the often-called-for formal integration. Cuvelier has shown how the support of Rwanda for the RCD heralded a growing cooperation between businesses, politicians, and high-ranking military on both sides of the border. SOMIGL (Société minière des grands lacs) and the CHC (Congo Holding Company) were instruments set up by the rebel group and Rwanda to get as much financial benefit as possible out of the international interest in Kivu's natural resources. Two Rwandan companies with close links to the RPF and the army, Rwanda Metals and Grands Lacs Metals, were key in organizing the Congolese commercial ventures of the Kigali regime. What is novel about what Taylor suggests are "neo-imperialist" regional networks of violence and accumulation is that they are managing to develop their own links and ties to the international arena, often on their own terms. The type of alliances and transboundary networks currently reconfiguring Central Africa may well, in his view, offer a prophetic vision of what may be in store for vulnerable and peripheral areas of the world.

LOCAL DYNAMICS

These megacommunications developed against the background of several local-level conflicts. Problems related to identity in the Kivu region are ancient. Important migratory flows before, during, and after the colonial period; considerable demographic pressure; the uncertain status of (neo)traditional authorities; the political and economic dynamism of the region; its peripheral situation in the Zairean context; and its partial incorporation in the East African space are all factors that form the local background to events in Eastern Zaire. The most visible and violent expression of this was the situation of the Banyarwanda, the Kinyarwanda speakers living in the Kivu. They consisted of several groups: the "natives," established since precolonial days; the "immigrants" and the "transplanted" of the colonial period; the "infiltrators" and "clandestines" before and after independence (1960); and the Tutsi* and Hutu* refugees. This mixture gave birth to conflict in the 1960s during the so-called Kanyarwanda rebellion, when the Banyarwanda faced the threat of expulsion from the North Kivu region. After a long period of
calm under the regime of Mobutu, whose influential director of the Political Bureau, Barthélemy Bisengimana, was himself of Tutsi origin, the problem came to the fore again during the National Conference (1991–1992), when representatives of civil society of North and South Kivu raised the question of the “Zaireans of dual or doubtful citizenship,” a coded expression referring to the Banyarwanda.

Although the conflicts have older roots, this chapter picks up the story from early 1993 onward.29 The events that started in North Kivu in March 1993 show how fluid ethnic categories are. Indeed, those who became the victims of a wave of violence waged by “indigenous” ethnic groups, such as the Hunde, Nande, and Nyanga, supported by their respective militias (the mai-mai and the Bangilima), were the Banyarwanda, Hutu, and Tutsi alike. Only two years later Hutu and Tutsi confronted each other in ethnic strife. There are various reasons for the violence that erupted in early 1993. First, the democratization process underway since 1990 opened up a new way of competing for power. As only nationals exercise political rights, citizenship became important, particularly in regions with a high proportion of Banyarwanda—in the extreme case of the zone of Masisi, they numbered 70 percent of the population. Second, in this relatively overpopulated part of Zaire, conflicts over land set groups against each other in two ways. On the one hand, as also seen elsewhere, two types of land use, agriculture and stock breeding, entered into competition with each other. On the other, two concepts of land tenure and access to land clashed: land use by members of a group that holds corporate ownership (the customary law regime) as opposed to the concept of individual ownership of the modern law type, which allows for contractual transactions in land. A third source of conflict, not unrelated to the previous one, concerned the position of customary authorities. Groups that are immigrant or presented as such tend to try to free themselves from the authority of local chiefs, thus threatening their position and differentiating themselves from “indigenous” populations. Pastoral communities of Tutsi extraction more frequently adopted this attitude of distancing. Under these circumstances the denial of citizenship became a means for politically and economically excluding the Banyarwanda, the Tutsi in particular.

The conflict came to the fore again during the Zairean National Conference, and confrontations had already taken place in 1991 and 1992, particularly in the zones of Masisi and Rutshuru. However, conflict spread dramatically in March 1993.30 As the casualties show, a real war broke out with many deaths: “indigenous” and “immigrant” communities lost about one thousand each; tens of thousands more were displaced. In late 1993 to early 1994 North Kivu was pacified for a brief period through the deployment of the Special Presidential Division (Division spéciale présidentielle, or DSP) and a successful peace-making initiative by the local Catholic church and NGOs.

Only a few months after pacification North Kivu was flooded by over 700,000 Rwandan Hutu refugees who fled the civil war in their country and the victorious RPF, accompanied and to some extent controlled by those responsible for the Rwandan genocide. Concentrated in five huge camps (Katale, Kahindo, Kibumba,
Lac Vert, and Mugunga) on a limited area close to the Rwandan border, they completely upset the demographic situation and, therefore, the politics of the region. At the beginning of the 1990s approximately 425,000 Banyarwanda lived in the three zones (Masisi, Rutshuru, and Goma) where the refugees settled; out of a total population of about 1 million, this was about 40 percent. Obviously, as a result of this massive injection of people, the Banyarwanda and the Rwandan refugees suddenly constituted the majority of the regional population. In addition, the Hutu (both the Rwandan refugees and the Zairean Hutu) had now become largely dominant in numbers, thus breaking the fragile balance put in place earlier in the year. The alliance of Hutu and Tutsi Banyarwanda broke up, and as in Rwanda, the two groups entered into violent conflict. The massive arrival of refugees also had other destabilizing effects: the environment was thoroughly disturbed by deforestation, poaching, and pressure on water supplies; the economy was destabilized by dollarization and the dramatic decrease of livestock; and basic infrastructure, already very weak before the crisis, was badly damaged.

However, large-scale violence did not start until November 1995. Probably unwillingly, the Zairean government contributed to the instability in August 1995 by announcing that the Rwandan refugees were to be expelled; they were given until December 31, 1995, to leave the country. As a result, many refugees left the camps and attempted to settle in the zones of Masisi and Rutshuru, where they inevitably clashed with the "natives" and Tutsi Banyarwanda whose houses and land they threatened to occupy. On a more general political level these attempts at occupation heightened many Zaireans' fears that a "Hutu-land" was being put in place in North Kivu. Incidents of uneven intensity in September and October 1995 were the prelude to a real war that started first in Masisi but rapidly spread to Rutshuru and Lubero.

The extension of violence was enhanced by the ambiguous attitude of the local authorities, used to manipulating ethnicity for plutocratic purposes. Thus in May 1995 the governor of North Kivu, Christophe Moto Mupenda, stated during a public meeting before a Hunde audience in the town of Masisi that "hospitality has its limits" and that it was necessary "to strike and strike now against the immigrants." During the following year two Goma-based radio stations fueled anti-Tutsi feelings while megaphones were used to call on residents to chase the Tutsi out of town; local authorities arrested Tutsi businessmen without specific charges. In November 1995 FAZ chief of staff General Eluki declared publicly that "the Hunde, Nyanga and Batembo are right to fight for the land of their ancestors and to chase the foreigners away from it."

Autesserre has shown that the relationship between local and national or regional tensions was not merely top-down and that issues usually presented as regional or national had significant local components, which fueled and reinforced the larger dimensions. This reality was particularly strong in the region, as Hutu and Tutsi are found in both Kivus, Rwanda, and Burundi, a situation that is conducive to cross-border alliances, solidarities, and strategies.
IMPUNITY

Although an important factor, the practice of impunity for persistent gross violations of human rights can only be briefly mentioned. The humanitarian consequences of the conflicts in the Great Lakes Region over the last quarter century have been disastrous. Millions have died since 1990, of which well over a million were the victims of direct violence. Generally speaking, those responsible for crimes against humanity, war crimes, and even genocide have remained unpunished. The only justice at work in the region has been victor’s justice meted out to the authors of the genocide in Rwanda, MLC leader Jean-Pierre Bemba, and a few FDLR warlords. However, the RPF, for instance, was not held accountable for the crimes it committed in Rwanda before, during, and after the genocide nor for those perpetrated in Zaire/DRC, particularly at the end of 1996 and the beginning of 1997. Although these crimes were well documented, no prosecutions took place before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, before Rwandan or Congolese courts, or before courts in third countries on the basis of universal jurisdiction.

This practice of victor’s justice had a dual consequence. On the one hand, as impunity prevailed, it reassured criminals that they could commit new crimes without risk of judicial prosecution. For instance, it is likely that the RPA would not have massacred tens of thousands of civilian refugees in Zaire/DRC had those responsible for crimes committed in Rwanda in 1994 been prosecuted before the ICTR. On the other hand, biased justice created frustration and resentment among the victims of these crimes, thus creating a fertile breeding ground for new violence. Many Rwandan Hutu and Congolese remember what the RPA did to them, and they may well take revenge if and when the occasion presents itself.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has addressed the combination of factors that allows one to understand the long period of war and instability in the Great Lakes Region. Although this analysis has an explanatory function, it may also offer clues to future developments; indeed, if these factors are still present, one could conclude that a context favorable to continued instability prevails.

Although some steps have been made toward state reconstruction in the DRC, the state remains very fragile, particularly—but not exclusively—in the east, where earlier conflicts started. Territorial control is limited, private taxation continues, and the illegal exploitation and smuggling of natural resources go on.

With regard to neighbors’ civil wars, the one in Angola came to an end in 2002. The last remaining Burundian rebel movement, Palipehutu-FNL, laid down arms at the end of 2008 to become a political party under the name FNL. However, after several opposition parties rejected the outcome of the 2010 elections, some politicians, including former rebel leaders, went underground or fled abroad, but
most later returned. At the time of writing, the country is facing renewed violence as a result of protests against Nkurunziza's election for a third, unconstitutional term. The Ugandan ADF continue to operate on both sides of the Congo-Uganda border in the Ruwenzori region. The LRA is no longer active inside Uganda, but it is still present in the DRC, though many of its fighters have relocated to the Central African Republic. The porous region straddling the DRC, the CAR, and South Sudan remains particularly open to insurgent activities. Although peace seems to have returned in Rwanda, this is only apparent. Structural violence is widespread, and an authoritarian regime attempts to keep a lid on the volcano. Dissident Tutsi who once occupied very high positions in the Rwandan political and military establishment entered into open opposition in 2010. They created a political structure, the Rwanda National Congress, intent on overthrowing Kagame. The Hutu FDLR continue to be active in both South and North Kivu, and Rwanda has supported Congolese insurgent groups until 2013. It started aiding a Burundian rebel movement in 2015.

In a situation of relative regional peace, alliances between states have become less prominent, but they have not disappeared. Thus, after Tanzania suggested that Rwanda should engage in talks with the FDLR and played a large part in defeating Rwanda's proxy M23 as a contributor to the Force Intervention Brigade, relations between the two countries soured. A Kigali-Kampala axis now opposes a Dar-es-Salaam-Bujumbura axis, which threatens the very survival of the East African Community. Alliances also continue to be concluded at more reduced scales. Thus, the Rwandan RPF dissidents are suspected of having been in contact with armed movements in Eastern DRC and possibly with elements of the FDLR while at the same time seeking support inside Rwanda.19

In the Kivu provinces in particular the national army, several armed groups, and Uganda and Rwanda continue to exploit Congolese resources. Despite attempts to tag some materials and to raise awareness in the business community of due-diligence guidelines, conflict around mineral and other wealth remains attractive. The UN panel of experts found that minerals continued to be transported through illegal border crossings between the two Kivus and Rwanda.20 A recent UN Group of Experts report noted that this traffic continues up to the present day through the role traders from Rwanda play in "laundering" Congolese minerals by using Rwandan tags and certificates.21

Local tensions based on (ethnic) identity remain as intense as before, in Rwanda in particular, and cross-border alignments along these lines are still present. However, intra-Tutsi elite differences, as shown by the dissidence of the RNC and the fact that many Tutsi Banyamulenge are opposed to the regime in Kigali, may alleviate the ethnic divide, though other lethal alliances and the emergence of new violent strategies may replace this.

Finally, the issue of impunity has not been addressed seriously. For instance, the 2010 Mapping Report of the UN High Commission for Human Rights has not (yet) been acted upon. However, in March 2013 Bosco Ntaganda, a former warlord
in Ituri and later leader of the CNDP and M23, surrendered to the International Criminal Court, where he stands indicted for war crimes and crimes against humanity. This is another instance of victor’s justice though, as Ntaganda led a faction of M23 that was on the losing side, and he fled to the safety of The Hague in fear for his life.

Clearly, the conflict factors outlined in this chapter have not disappeared, although they have generally decreased in extent and intensity. Two of these factors need to be especially monitored. On the one hand, for both the development of the country and regional stability, state reconstruction in the DRC is an essential condition. Given the colossal nature of this endeavor, putting Humpty Dumpty together again will need to start with the main functions of sovereignty: regaining control over the state’s territory and reestablishing links with the population; rebuilding public fiscal capacity, with revenues collected and spent in a transparent, efficient, and honest fashion as well as resources harnessed as public goods; and restoring legal security and the rule of law. Steps have been made since the end of the transition in 2006, but the DRC is still far from a properly functioning state. On the other hand, the Rwandan regime must address the country’s severe problems of political governance and stop aiding and abetting violence in neighboring countries. Although the pre-1994 regime generally enjoyed good neighborly relations, its successor has been involved in military and/or diplomatic conflicts with all of its four neighbors. Rwanda has been at the origin of two major regional wars, and it could be so again if current authoritarian practices at home and aggressive behavior abroad are not amended.

NOTES

1. This text uses the name of the country at the time of the events that are analyzed—that is, Zaire before May 1997, Congo or DRC after that date.


3. In addition to a ceasefire signed by the DRC, Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe as well as by the Congolese rebel movements, the accord provided for an “open national dialogue” involving the government, the rebel groups, the unarmed opposition, and civil society. This was to lead to a new political dispensation.

4. The AGI provided for a two- to three-year transitional period, during which the executive branch was to be made up of a president, four vice presidents, and a government in which the rebel movements and the unarmed opposition were to be represented. A bicameral parliament included the same entities as those represented in the government.

5. In early 2015 the UN Group of Experts found that the Congolese government failed to authorize military operations against the FDLR and refused to tackle the old problem of


11. The expression is from Sandrine Perrot, “Entrepreneurs de l’insécurité: la face cachée de l’armée congolaise,” Politique Africaine no. 75 (1999), pp. 60–71. It refers to rational makers of cost-benefit analyses who realize that war, instability, and the absence of the state are more profitable than peace, stability, and state reconstruction.

12. Forces Armées Zairoises until May 1997, Forces Armées Congolaises between 1997 and 2003. The national army was renamed Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) as a result of the AGI.


15. In 1990 a wing known as the RCD-MI broke away in protest over Rwandan domination and placed itself under Ugandan tutelage. The RCD-Goma remained a proxy for Rwanda.


17. Ibid., p. 33.


19. Ibid., para. 31.

20. See, for example, UN Security Council, Letter Dated 12 January 2015.

21. Thomas Turner (The Congo Wars: Conflict, Myth and Reality [London, New York: Zed Books, 2007], pp. 15–46) rightly points out that this threat applied to the regime but not per se to Rwanda as a whole. Indeed, the majority of the population may well have considered those posing this threat to be its allies and potential liberators. Likewise, when Kibibi argued that it needed to protect the Congolese Tutsi, this may well have reflected the feelings of many Rwandan Tutsi but probably not those of many Hutu.

23. The EU Special Representative for the Great Lakes Region Aldo Ajello has confirmed this information to this author.

24. According to the then US ambassador to Kigali, Robert Gribbin, Kagame had already told him in March 1996 that “if Zaire continues to support the ex-FAR/Interahamwe against Rwanda, Rwanda in turn could find anti-Mobutu elements to support,” adding that “if the international community could not help improve security in the region, the RFA might be compelled to act alone.” Robert E. Gribbin, In the Aftermath of Genocide: The U.S. Role in Rwanda (New York: IUniverse, 2005), pp. 144–145.

25. The existence of this project was later confirmed by documents discovered in Mugunga-camp in November 1996. Although these documents have never been published, some echoes can be found in extracts published in newspapers, for example Le Monde, November 19, 1996, and Le Figaro, November 20, 1996. It is surprising that neither the AFDL nor the RFA have kept these archives; on the contrary, they reportedly burned them. S. Boyle, “Rebels Repel Zaire Counter-Offensive,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, April 1, 1997. However, copies of a number of these papers are on file with this author.


29. Thus, the Angolan weekly Espresso of May 3, 1997, affirmed that President Dos Santos insisted that Kabila should pursue his offensive to the end.

30. Having fled to Angola after the collapse of the Katanga secession in early 1963, a number of them were eventually integrated into the Angolan army, of which they—or rather, their sons—became the 24th Regiment in 1994.

31. As expressed by an astonishing post by Kagame on his Twitter account on May 8, 2015: “President #Kagame: If your citizens tell you we don’t want you to lead us, how do you say I am staying whether you want me or not #Burundi.” Coming from a president about the president of a neighboring country, the least one can say is that this very hostile communication was not aimed at appeasing bilateral relations.


34. The exact amount, due mainly to the state-owned Zimbabwe Defence Industries (ZDI), is unknown, but estimates range from US$40 million to US$200 million.

35. Zimbabwe happened to chair SADC’s Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security. As Kabila’s Congo had become a member of SADC, it benefited from a defense agreement providing for member states’ assistance in case of an attack. However, South Africa and Botswana disagreed with the intervention in the DRC. Although presented as such by the coalition of the willing, it is doubtful whether the operation of Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe occurred under the SADC umbrella.
36. Other members of the club included Eritrean Afewerki and Ethiopia's Meles Zenawi. All four eventually turned out to be just banal African dictators.
37. Addressing the Economic Commission for Africa in Addis Ababa on December 9, 1997, Secretary Madeleine Albright stated, without mentioning their names, that "Africa's best new leaders have brought a new spirit of hope and accomplishment to your countries—and that spirit is sweeping across the continent. . . . [African] new leaders share a common vision of empowerment—for all their citizens, for their nations, and for their continent. . . . They are moving boldly to change the way their countries work—and the way we work with them."
38. Space prohibits a discussion of the mai-mai phenomenon. Suffice it to say that this is a generic term designating a wide array of local groups with very diverse organizational structures and ideologies, all claiming to protect the "indigenous" populations against attacks by "foreigners." A useful treatment can be found in Koen Vlassenroot, "The Making of a New Order: Dynamics of Conflict and Dialectics of War in South Kivu (DR Congo)" (PhD diss., University of Ghent, 2000), pp. 300–343. Vlassenroot insists on the fact that, although the mai-mai were also a resistance movement against foreign occupation, they can only be understood as an indigenous reaction to marginalization and exclusion. The theme of the mai-mai militias as an experience of more egalitarian forms of solidarity based social organization, with violence as its main discursive mode, is developed in Frank Van Acker and Koen Vlassenroot, "Les 'mai-mai' et les fonctions de la violence milicienne dans l'Est du Congo," Politique Africaine no. 84 (December 2001), pp. 103–116.
39. It is important to restate that, contrary to Rwandan claims (thus "justifying" the invasion by the RPA), this occurred after the beginning of the war. In other words, the Rwandan invasion was not a consequence of the involvement of "génocidaires" but rather its cause.
43. The East African, August 30–September 5, 1999.
45. A Congolese acquaintance of this author compared the fighting in Kisangani to two neighbors breaking into his house and then fighting in his living room over who would steal his television set.
46. The panel's early work was criticized on account of both its focus on the activities of the rebel groups and their sponsors as well as its definition of "illegality." Although these criticisms were not unfounded, the value of the panel's work is considerable: it has unearthed a large amount of empirical data and, in the later phase of its work, redressed the balance by inquiring into the predatory practices of the Kabila regime and its allies, Zimbabwe in particular.

49. Several reports point to the direct link between the exploitation of resources and the continuation of the conflict. The UN Panel noted that the control of mineral-rich areas "could be seen primarily as an economic and financial objective rather than a security objective for Rwanda" (UN Security Council, *Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, S/2002/357, April 12, 2002, para. 175); "Most of the fights between Rwandan soldiers and mi-mai have occurred in the so-called 'coltan belt'" (ibid., para. 176). Under the title "Rwanda's Unusual Tactics," the panel found that "attacks (by the RPA) seem to coincide with the period when coltan has been extracted and put in bags for evacuation by the mi-mai. Attacked, the mi-mai abandon their coltan, which is then taken away by small aircraft" (ibid., para. 177).


53. Indeed, post-1994 Rwanda has been called "an army with a state," rather than a state with an army. In the Kivus, the Rwandan army was nicknamed "Soldiers without borders," a wink to the international NGO "Médecins sans frontières."


56. This may seem a modest figure, but in light of the structure of the Rwandan economy it is gigantic. Indeed, in that same year, the production of export crops (mainly coffee and tea) only accounted for 0.4 percent of GDP (International Monetary Fund, *Rwanda: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix*, IMF Country Report no. 04/383, 2004, p. 80).


58. Of course, it was not really invisible, but the international community preferred to turn a blind eye to these practices. US Ambassador Gribbin, for one, candidly acknowledged this reality: "Rwanda had discovered during the first war that war in Congo was relatively cheap—even profitable. . . . Well connected Rwandans . . . could seize opportunities . . . to accumulate wealth" (Gribbin, *In the Aftermath of Genocide*, pp. 282–283).


64. Sénat de Belgique, *Rapport fait au nom de la commission*, p. 119.


68. Ibid., p. 52.

69. The latter category of Rwandans was imported between 1937 and 1935 as workers as a result of deliberative policies by the Belgian colonial authorities, which even set up an agency (Mision d'immigration des Banyarwanda, MIB) to that effect.


71. These arrived massively in mid-1994.


77. ANB-BIA, April 1, 1996.


79. Already in 1998 a UN investigative team concluded that "the systematic massacre of those (Hutu refugees) remaining in Zaire was an abhorrent crime against humanity, but the underlying rationale for the decision is material to whether these killings constituted genocide, that is, a decision to eliminate, in part, the Hutu ethnic group" (UN Security Council, *Report of the Investigative Team Charged with Investigating Serious Violations of*
Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law in the Democratic Republic of Congo, S/1998/581, June 29, 1998, para. 96). A mapping exercise conducted on behalf of the UN High Commission for Human Rights, published in 2010, confirmed and detailed a long list of atrocities uncovered earlier by UN panels, national and international NGOs, and investigative journalists. It concluded that the vast majority of the 617 listed incidents were to be classified as war crimes and crimes against humanity. On the issue of genocide it noted that "several incidents listed in this report, if investigated and judicially proven, point to circumstances and facts from which a court could infer the intention to destroy the Hutu ethnic group in the DRC in part, if these were established beyond all reasonable doubt."


84. Ibid., paras. 484–492. For instance, the panel found that the house in Goma of General Bosco Ntaganda was on a street that crosses the border into Gisenyi, Rwanda, and that the entire area between the official border crossings was controlled exclusively by soldiers loyal to Ntaganda. The minerals were usually brought in vehicles into the neutral zone, after which they were transported across the border to the Rwandan side, where they were loaded onto other vehicles. During smuggling operations Ntaganda’s troops cut off all access to the area. Rwandan soldiers had sentry posts all along the border, and nothing could cross without their knowledge. The panel estimated that Ntaganda’s troops moved about $15,000 per week by taxing at this crossing point. Ibid., paras. 485–487.


Appendix 10.1: Time Line

1993
October 21. Coup d'état in Burundi; beginning of civil war.

1994
April–July. Resumption of the civil war in Rwanda; genocide against the Tutsi; RPF seizes power; 2 million Hutu, including defeated army and militia, flee to neighboring countries, Zaire in particular.
1995
Fall. Large-scale violence in North Kivu; hit-and-run operations by Rwandan Hutu refugees, operating from Zaire, against targets in Rwanda.

1996
September. Start of the "Banyamulenge rebellion" supported by Rwanda.
October. Creation in Kigali of AFDL with Laurent-Désiré Kabila as its spokesperson.
October–December. AFDL, supported by Rwanda and Uganda, occupies a buffer zone in Eastern Zaire, stretching from Kaléncie to Bunia.

1997
February. Angola joins the anti-Mobutu coalition.
May 37. Fall of Kinshasa.
May 29. Kabila sworn in as president of DRC, the new name of Zaire.

1998
August 2. Beginning of a new Congolese "rebellion" masterminded by Rwanda.
August 12. RCD rebel movement formally launched.
August 23. Fall of Kisangani.
November. Creation of another rebel movement, the MLC, with Ugandan support.

1999
May–June, August. Fighting between Rwandan and Ugandan armies in Kisangani.

2000

2001

2002
February 25. Launch of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue in Sun City (South Africa).
September. Rwanda officially pulls out troops from the DRC but retains a covert presence.
December 17. Global and Inclusive Accord (AGI) signed in Pretoria.

2003
June. European EUPF force deployed in Ituri; replaced by MONUC Ituri brigade in September.
June–July. 1+4 Presidency, transitional government and transitional parliament in place.

2005
2006
July 30. First round of presidential elections: Kabila 44.89 percent, Bemba 20.03 percent, Gisenge 13.06 percent; parliamentary elections: PPRD 111 seats, MLC 64, PALU 34, RCD-Goma 35.
October 29. Second round of presidential elections: Kabila 58.05 percent, Bemba 41.95 percent.
December. Creation of the CNDF rebel movement headed by Laurent Nkunda.

2008
August. Heavy fighting between FARDC and CNDF; Congolese government accused Rwanda of backing Nkunda; Rwanda denies.

2009
January. Joint DRC-Rwanda operation against CNFD; Nkunda replaced by Bosco Ntaganda and placed under house arrest in Rwanda.
March. Peace deal between DRC government and CNDF.
March-August. Joint FARDC-MONUSCO operation “Kimia II” against FDLR.

2010
October. Publication of UN Mapping Report on gross human rights violations 1993-2003; claims a number of acts committed by AFDL/RPA might constitute genocide.

2011
January. DRC constitution amended, introducing relative as opposed to the previous absolute majority for presidential election.
November. Presidential elections: Kabila 48.95 percent, Tshisekedi 32.33 percent; parliamentary elections: PPRD largest party in highly fragmented parliament; legitimacy of elections contested domestically and internationally.

2012
April. Creation of rebel movement M23, an offspring of the CNDF.
October. UN Group of Experts accuses Rwanda and Uganda of supporting M23; both countries deny.
November. M23 briefly occupies North Kivu provincial capital Goma.

2013
March. Bosco Ntaganda surrenders to the ICC.
July. UN Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) deployed to disarm rebel groups.
November. M23 defeated by FARDC and MONUSCO/FIB.

2015
April. Burundian President Nkurunziza candidate for unconstitutional third term; announcement followed by violence; elections take place, but until the end of 2015 hundreds are killed and over two hundred thousand flee into exile.
December. Constitutional amendment allows President Kagame to run a third time in 2017 and possibly to remain in power until 2034.

2016
January. Several reports show Rwandan support for a nascent Burundian rebellion.
Appendix 10.2: Main Actors


Banyamulenge: Congolese Tutsi group living in South Kivu; started the war in September 1996 with the support of Rwanda.

Banyarwanda: Kinyarwanda speakers living in Eastern DRC; both Hutu and Tutsi.

Jean-Pierre Bemba: Leader of the MLC rebel movement; unsuccessful presidential candidate in 2006; indicted by the ICC for war crimes committed in the Central African Republic.

Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP): Congolese Tutsi militia, formally integrated in FARDC, supported by Rwanda; its leader, Laurent Nkunda, arrested by Rwandans in early 2009, replaced by Bosco Ntaganda.

Force Intervention Brigade (FIB): Deployed from April 2013 in support of FARDC and MONUSCO to neutralize armed groups; troops contributed by South Africa, Tanzania, and Malawi; defeated M23 in November 2013.

Forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR): Former Rwandan government army that retreated to Eastern Zaire after its defeat in the summer of 1994 and conducted raids against Rwanda from the refugee camps in 1995–1996.

Forces Armées Zairiennes (FAZ)/Forces Armées Congolaises (FAC)/Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC): Successive names of the Zaïrean/ Congolese government army.

Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération de la RDC (FDLR): Rwandan Hutu rebel movement operating in Eastern DRC.

Joseph Kabila: Son of Laurent-Désiré Kabila, who succeeded his father as president in January 2001; elected president in 2006; reelected in 2011.

Laurent-Désiré Kabila: Leader of the AFDL; became president in May 1997; assassinated in January 2001.

Paul Kagame: Leader of the RPF/RPA; de facto ruler of Rwanda since 1994; became president in 2000; reelected in 2003; reelected in 2010.

Mai-mais: Local militias operating in North and South Kivu; claim to protect local populations against "invaders."

Mobutu Sese Seko: President of Zaire from 1965 to 1997; overthrown by Laurent-Désiré Kabila in May 1997; died a few months later in exile in Morocco.

Mouvement du 23 mars (M23): Successor to the CNDP; created in April 2012 with Rwandan support; defeated by FARDC and FIB in November 2013.


Yoweri Museveni: President of Uganda since 1986.

Bosco Ntaganda: Leader of the CNDP and general in the FARDC; indicted by ICC for war crimes committed in Ituri.

Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD): Rwandan-backed rebel movement that started a war against the Kabila regime in August 1998.

Rwanda Defence Forces: Rwandan national army (formerly RPA).

Rwanda Patriotic Front/Army (RPF/A): Tutsi-dominated movement that started a rebellion in October 1959 and took power in July 1994; de facto single party.

Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF): Ugandan national army.

Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC): Main Ituri militia group; its leader, Thomas Lubanga, was the first to be convicted by the ICC in 2012.